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Abstract 
Just as Lee, Briggs & Dennis [13] showed that a 
rigorous conception of “explanation” leads to 
requirements for a positivist theory to satisfy, and 
just as Lee & Hovorka [14] showed that a rigorous 
conception of “interpretation” leads to requirements 
for an interpretive theory to satisfy, we show that a 
rigorous conception of “systems” leads to certain 
requirements for a systems theory to satisfy. We 
apply basics of systems science in general, as well as 
basics of Luhmann’s [17, 20] systems perspective in 
particular. We illustrate these basics with empirical 
material from a case about the role of information 
technology in anti-money laundering. The example 
demonstrates that research in information systems, 
which has been informed by positivism, 
interpretivism, and design, can be additionally and 
beneficially informed by systems science – which, 
ironically, has been largely absent in information 
“systems” research. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
What is systems science, what are requirements 
that systems science imposes on theorizing, and how 
can research on information systems benefit from and 
satisfy these requirements? 
A premise of this essay is that the academic 
discipline of information systems, in incorporating 
the word “systems” in its name (e.g., the Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences and the 
Management Information Systems Quarterly), needs 
to take “systems” seriously. Ironically, this academic 
discipline has not availed itself of the rich intellectual 
heritage of systems science (of which the few notable 
exceptions include the work of Peter Checkland [6] 
and of Steven Alter [1]). Following not only Lee, 
Briggs & Dennis [13] who examined how to craft 
theory to satisfy the requirements of explanation, but 
also Lee & Hovorka [14] who examined how to craft 
theory to satisfy the requirements of interpretation, 
we examine, in this essay, how to craft theory to 
satisfy the requirements of systems science. 
The next and second section of this essay will 
offer some of the basic, general, and widely agreed-
upon features of systems science. The purpose is not 
to present all features of systems science, but to 
extract key ideas useful for differentiating systems 
theorizing from theorizing in positivism, 
interpretivism, and design so that researchers already 
familiar with the latter can perceive additional 
benefits and insights afforded by the former. 
The third section will present features of the 
specific form of systems theorizing advanced by 
Niklas Luhmann (1927-1998), a scholar whose work 
has been increasingly felt in the information-systems 
research community. Luhmann adapted systems 
theory in a way that is readily useful to the large 
school of behavioral research already ensconced in 
the information-systems research community. 
In the fourth section of the essay, we will abstract, 
from the preceding discussion on systems science, 
requirements for systems theorizing to satisfy. 
In the fifth section, we will apply these 
requirements in a case of systems theorizing about 
the role of information technology in anti-money 
laundering. 
 
2. Some Basics of Systems Science in 
General 
 
 Diverse schools of thought characterize systems 
science no less than positivist science, interpretive 
science, and design science. 
In this essay, we approach systems science as an 
empirical science, where its object of study is 
systems in general, rather than systems of specific 
types, such as social systems, computer systems, and 
ecological systems [11]. Therefore statements that 
systems science makes about “systems” would be 
applicable across systems of specific types, such as 
social systems, biological systems, computer 
systems, and ecological systems. In fact, the vision of 
the founders of the Society for General Systems 
Research in 1954 – Ludwig von Bertalanffy [3], 
Kenneth Boulding [4], James Grier Miller [19] and 
Anatol Rapoport [23] was exactly that: the gradual 
development of a science that would synthesize 
fundamental principles from different fields. It was 
the idea of a science that would evolve into a meta-
 
 
 
theory through which a diverse array of different 
phenomena – across different systems – would be 
described, modeled, investigated. Hammond, who 
traced the evolution of systems theory in her work on 
the history of systems theorizing, called the whole 
endeavor a science of synthesis [9]. 
Indicative of the long history of systems science 
and its relation to information is Leo Szilard’s 1929 
paper [30], which exposed the difference between 
matter/energy and information, and from which the 
cybernetics paradigm eventually emerged. Also, it is 
generally acknowledged that Shannon and Weaver’s 
The Mathematical Theory of Communication [28] is 
second only to Norbert Wiener’s Cybernetics [31] in 
establishing concepts for the evolution of systems 
thinking (including information, communication, and 
of course, feedback). Thus, the groundwork has 
already been laid for more definitively establishing 
connections and identifying common core principles 
between systems science and the study of information 
systems. 
Systems science is also known as “General 
Systems Theory” (GST). Overlapping versions of 
GST have been rendered by Bertalanffy [3], 
Boulding [4], and others. Boulding emphasizes its 
generality by describing it as “the skeleton of science 
in the sense that it aims to provide a framework or 
structure of systems on which to hang the flesh and 
blood of particular disciplines and particular subject 
matters in an orderly and coherent corpus of 
knowledge” [4, p. 208]. 
What, then, is a “system”? According to 
Bertalanffy [3, p. 143] 
 
A system can be defined as a complex of 
interacting elements p1, p2 … pn. Interaction 
means that the elements stand in a certain 
relation, R, so that their behaviour in R is 
different from their behavior in an another 
relation, R'. On the other hand, if the behavior in 
in R and R' is not different, there is no interaction, 
and the elements behave independently with 
respect to the relations R and R'. 
 
As succinct as Bertalanffy’s definition might be, it 
has ramifications of major significance that emerge 
when made explicit. Hegel, according to Skyttner 
[29, pp. 49-50]: 
 
…formulated the following statements concerning 
the nature of systems. 
• The whole is more than the sum of the parts 
[e.g., Bertalanffy’s p1, p2 … pn]. 
• The whole defines the nature of the parts. 
• The parts cannot be understood by studying the 
whole. 
• The parts are dynamically interrelated or 
interdependent. 
 
Skyttner, moreover, offers a summary of properties 
of general systems for which he credits Bertalanffy, 
Litterer, and others [29, p.53]: 
 
• Interrelationship and interdependence of 
objects and their attributes: Unrelated and 
independent elements can never constitute a 
system. 
• Holism: Holistic properties not possible to 
detect by analysis should be possible to define 
in the system. 
• Goal seeking: Systemic interaction must result 
in some goal or final state to be reached or 
some equilibrium point being approached. 
• Transformation process: All systems, if they 
are to attain their goal, must transform inputs 
into outputs. In living systems this 
transformation is mainly of a cyclical nature. 
• Inputs and outputs: In a closed system the 
inputs are determined once and for all; in an 
open system additional inputs are admitted 
from its environment. 
… 
• Regulation: The interrelated objects 
constituting the system must be regulated in 
some fashion so that its goals can be realized. 
Regulation implies that necessary deviations 
will be detected and corrected. …  
• Hierarchy: Systems are generally complex 
wholes made up of smaller subsystems. This 
nesting of systems within other systems is what 
is implied by hierarchy. 
• Differentiation: In complex systems, 
specialized units perform specialized functions. 
This is a characteristic of all complex systems 
and may also be called specialization or 
division of labour. 
• Equifinality and multifinality: Open systems 
have equally valid alternative ways of attaining 
the same objectives from different initial 
conditions (convergence) or, from a given 
initial state, obtain different and mutually 
exclusive, objectives (divergence). 
 
The ramifications in the preceding two lists can all be 
considered to be detailed restatements or elaborations 
of Bertalanffy’s succinct definition of “system.” 
Worth emphasizing are systems science’s three 
interrelated features that “the whole is more than the 
 
 
 
sum of the parts,” “the parts are dynamically 
interrelated or interdependent,” and “holistic 
properties not possible to detect by analysis should be 
possible to define in the system.”  These three 
features have ramifications that serve to distinguish, 
in two major ways, systems theorizing from positivist 
theorizing in information systems (IS) research. 
The first major way in which systems theorizing 
is distinguished from positivist IS research is that 
systems theorizing breaks outside of the boxes-and-
arrows depictions to which much positivist IS 
research is beholden. The latter typically 
operationalizes theories in the form of multivariate 
statistical models and visually presents them in the 
form of boxes-and-arrows diagrams; the boxes 
denote variables and the arrows denote causal 
relationships between them, where the arrows may 
point in only one direction between each pair of 
variables. In systems theorizing, however, what 
positivist IS research considers to be a dependent 
variable “Y,” which is determined by independent 
variables such as “X1” and “X2,” may also act, 
recursively, to determine “X1” and “X2.” In fact, any 
specified system can acquire information about its 
own functioning and this can then contribute towards 
a change of its functioning. Indeed, in systems 
theory, the very ontology of an “independent” 
variable is paradoxical! In other words, the 
unidirectional relationships in positivist IS research 
gives way to bidirectional or recursive relationships 
in systems theorizing, which are more realistic but 
also too mathematically intractable to be incorporated 
into the multivariate statistical models (typically, 
regression models and structural equation modeling) 
used in positivist IS research. Indeed, the infeasibility 
of modeling, and the resulting absence of, 
bidirectional or recursive relationships throughout 
almost all positivist IS research precludes it from 
qualifying as truly systems research. 
The second major way in which the two are 
distinct is that positivist IS research regards 
alternative ways of explaining the same phenomenon 
to be competing explanations or competing theories, 
of which at most one may survive as the right one, 
whereas systems theorizing (through its feature of 
equifinality) routinely accepts such alternatives as 
pathways carved out by different observers (in 
particular, different observing researchers) that lead 
to the same result, where typically more than just one 
of the pathways is regarded as feasible. This idea 
bypasses the problem-solution duality and focuses 
more on the description of systems as observer-
designated connections between elements and their 
relations. Systems theorizing recognizes that if a 
problem “uniquely prescribed its solution, it would 
evoke its one and only (dis)solution” [24] .  
Reflecting the contrast between positivist IS 
research and systems theorizing is the difference 
between analyzing and synthesizing. To analyze is to 
break down an entity down into the parts that make it 
up, where the goal of the analysis is to understand 
each part. On the other hand, to synthesize is not to 
break down, but to build up and combine, where the 
goal of the synthesis is to understand the resulting 
whole. Positivist IS research is marked by analysis 
and systems theorizing is marked by synthesis. 
Interpretive theorizing would, in principle, appear 
to be marked by synthesis, just as systems theorizing 
is. Consider that what Klein & Myers call “the 
fundamental principle of the hermeneutic circle” [10, 
pp. 71-73] explicitly recognizes that the whole 
(whether the whole of a text or a text analog) is 
greater than the sum of its parts. This is the 
recognition that the meaning of a text, as a whole, is 
not merely the sum total of the meanings of its 
individual words, but instead is synthesized from the 
web of relationships among the words. On the other 
hand, there are few instances of information systems 
research where, apart from simply being mentioned, 
the principle of the hermeneutic circle is explicitly 
operationalized and applied (one instance is found in 
Sarker & Lee [25]). 
 
3. Specifics of Luhmann’s Instance of 
Systems Science 
 
Niklas Luhmann embraced and further developed 
the basics of systems science, particularly with regard 
to its application to society. Luhmann’s work is 
complicated (to the point of being, on one’s first 
reading of it, impenetrable), but he provided the 
following diagram that usefully and clearly lays out 
his conceptualization of systems [16, p. 9, reprinted 
with permission][20]: 
 
 
 
We approach this diagram as presenting Luhmann’s 
ontology of systems, where we will devote the most 
attention to social systems. “Living systems” refer to 
biological entities. “Psychic systems” refer to the 
minds of human individuals. 
 
 
 
“Social systems” are communication systems, 
where Luhmann does not define communication 
simply as human individuals exchanging messages 
with one another through language, but instead 
regards communication as a process involving “a 
unity of announcement (Mitteilung), information 
(Information), and understanding (Verstehen)” [20, p. 
22], where the translation from German to the 
English term “announcement” has also instead been 
“utterance” [26, p.28]. Notice that this conception of 
communication recognizes that the understanding 
developed by a person who is listening to or reading 
a text may diverge from what is intended by the 
person who is speaking (or has authored the text). 
This conception of communication also recognizes 
non-verbal communication through interactions as in, 
for example, the economic system, where the 
interaction (i.e. economic communication) involves 
the “satisfaction of needs” and the meaning (or what 
Luhmann calls the “code”) is expressed through the 
unity of the distinction between “payment/non-
payment”; the legal system, where communication 
involves the “regulation of conflicts” and the 
meaning or code is in terms of “legal/illegal”; and the 
political system, where communication involves the 
“practical application of collectively binding 
decisions” and the meaning or code is in terms of 
“government/opposition” [20, p. 29]. In this regard, 
“codes” are binary distinctions that encapsulate the 
identity of a core system in society and support 
communication across all of their subsystems. 
Furthermore, according to Luhmann’s ontology, such 
core systems (labeled by Luhmann as “function 
systems”) include: the economic system, the legal 
system, and the political system; these are all systems 
that have been differentiated from society on the 
basis of unique bottom-to-top inventions, and all of 
them are supported in their autopoietic re-production 
by the function of communication. In a way, they are 
also communication systems.  
“Organizations,” as another form of social 
system, also conduct communication, but Luhmann 
specifically conceptualizes organizations as 
conducting the communication of decisions, and 
hence are “systems of decisions” [20, p. 31]. 
“Interactions” are yet another form of social 
system, but are short-lived and “typically operate on 
a ‘face-to-face’ level and presuppose physical 
presence” [20, p. 30]. 
Significantly and counter-intuitively, human 
individuals per se are not constituent parts of 
Luhmann’s social systems. Rather, Luhmann locates 
actual human individuals outside of social systems – 
in particular, note the placement of “psychic 
systems” next to, and outside of, social systems in the 
diagram above. Seidl and Becker describe it in this 
way [27, p. 29]: 
  
Luhmann clearly distinguishes between social 
systems and human beings (psychic systems): 
social systems reproduce themselves on the basis 
of communications, and psychic systems on the 
basis of thoughts. Both systems are operatively 
closed to each other and can merely cause mutual 
perturbations in each other. 
 
Luhmann recognizes that human minds, as “psychic 
systems,” can produce announcements/utterances, be 
the source of information, and develop 
understanding.  
Luhmann’s systems theory is particularly relevant 
to those information-systems researchers who 
subscribe to interpretivism and social theory. First, 
with regard to interpretivism, Ramage and Shipp 
point out Luhmann’s debt to Husserl [22, p. 13]: 
“The work of the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl 
was crucial to Luhmann’s work, especially the 
centrality he placed on the concept of meaning – our 
understanding and interpretation of ideas.” Second, 
with regard to social theory, Luhmann’s rendering of 
a social system with an existence beyond human 
individuals has its analogues in other social theory. 
Lee [15, p. 9] has similarly conceptualized “social” 
as follows: 
 
[S]ocial theory is not so much about human 
individuals as it is about shared, socially 
constructed institutions that endure even when the 
individuals who are momentarily present are 
replaced by new ones. … The things that stay the 
same, or at least change at a much slower pace 
than the turnover of people, would be social 
objects that include the organization’s culture, its 
social structure, its standard operating 
procedures, many of its business processes, its 
folklore and its norms for behaviour. In this 
alternative conceptualization, … social theory 
would more properly be about extra-individual 
entities such as culture and social structure than 
directly about individuals.  
 
Lee’s conception of the social as being extra-
individual, which is a restatement of a foundational 
concept in sociology, aligns perfectly with 
Luhmann’s conception of what a social system is. 
Key features of Luhmann’s systems theory worth 
emphasizing are: 
 
• System/Environment: For Luhmann, the 
environment is not a residual category (here 
 
 
 
system, there environment), but constitutive of 
the existence of the system. The two are 
structurally coupled and one cannot exist 
without the other. The distinction between 
system/environment (as a unit) is then 
replicated internally within the system: By way 
of what Luhmann calls “re-entry,” the system 
copies the distinction into itself (where this is 
an example of “self-reference,” described 
below). Significantly, from the perspective of 
any given system (such as the social system), 
its environment includes other systems with 
which it interacts.  
• Autopoiesis: In seeking to describe the self-
organizing re-creation of the cell, the biologist 
Humberto Maturana originally introduced the 
concept of autopoiesis as a replacement for the 
concept of circularity. He drew upon 
Aristotle’s distinction between praxis (an 
actual event that includes its purpose in itself) 
and poiesis (that which produces something 
external to itself). Luhmann then generalized 
Maturana’s conception of autopoiesis so that it 
could be useful for describing self-organization 
in social systems and other non-biological 
systems [18]. Some, but not all, systems exhibit 
the feature of autopoiesis. “The autopoietic 
system is one that produces itself. It is perhaps 
best understood in contrast to an allopoietic 
system, such as a factory, which takes in 
materials and uses them to produce something 
other than itself” [5]. 
• Communication: Although communication has 
already been mentioned, its centrality in the 
work of Luhmann calls for additional 
elaboration. Luhmann considers society as the 
only closed system, where it is closed by the 
function of communication. In Luhmann’s 
ontology, human beings are outside of this 
closed system, which means that, as a result, 
they cannot communicate; this leads to 
Luhmann’s locution that “only communication 
can communicate.”  As noted earlier, however, 
humans can participate in the process of 
communication, involving announce-
ment/utterance, information, and understand-
ing. 
• Self-reference: As a unique form of what 
Luhmann calls “re-entry,” self-reference 
denotes the ability of systems to refer to 
themselves and their constituent components, 
as well as the ability to replicate the 
system/environment distinction internally. 
Social systems are capable of both self-
reference and other-reference (relating and 
referring to their environment). There are 
various classifications for self-referential 
systems (e.g. neutral meaning, biological 
meaning, second-order cybernetics meaning). 
Luhmann subscribes to the latter where an 
organization collects information about its own 
functioning and this in turn can contribute 
towards a change of its functioning [8].  
 
By weaving aspects from different strands of 
systems theory into a systems theory that specifically 
includes social systems, Luhmann can be said to have 
elevated systems theory as a tool for the description 
of complex problems, as well as to have consolidated 
systems theory. All of the features of systems theory 
described in the preceding section, “Some Basics of 
Systems Science in General,” are inherited in 
Luhmann’s systems theory. 
 
4. A set of requirements for a systems 
theory to satisfy  
 
Based on our preceding discussion of some basics 
of systems science in general and Luhmann’s systems 
theory in particular, we offer the following as a set of 
requirements for a theory to satisfy in order to be 
considered a systems theory. Given the extensive 
diversity of systems approaches, the requirements we 
offer make up but one possible set, where the set is 
sufficient to be illustrative of systems theorizing. We 
derive three requirements from the earlier discussion 
on general systems theory (GST) and four 
requirements from the earlier discussion on 
Luhmann’s systems theory (LST). 
 
4.1. GST: Requirement to recognize that “the 
whole is more than the sum of the parts” 
 
Lee formulates this requirement as follows [12, p. 
210]: “To borrow an analogy from chemistry, the 
constituent parts of a system are like the reactive 
elements making up a compound, not the inert 
elements making up a mixture. …  A system is 
greater than the mere concatenation of its constituent 
subsystems.”  A system (like a compound) comes to 
have properties different from the respective 
properties of the individual subsystems (or the 
individual elements) that have reacted to each other 
in forming it.  H20 can be a liquid even when the H 
and O forming it are gases.  An ERP can be a failure 
even when the components forming it (including the 
hardware, software, and networks) are each 
successful when tested individually. 
 
 
 
One way to demonstrate that a systems theory 
satisfies this requirement is by showing that the same 
component, when in different combinations with 
different components with which it interacts, 
manifests different properties. For instance, an ERP 
consisting of the same configuration of hardware, 
software, and data structures can be a success in one 
company but a failure in another. The different 
business context establishes itself as an esoteric 
social environment to the technical system and in 
doing so triggers different structural couplings 
between the same configuration of hardware/ 
software/data and its human-activity context. What 
we casually call an “information system” is therefore, 
in this light, actually an emergent phenomenon.  
Another way to demonstrate this is by showing 
the existence of non-unidirectional relationships 
between components or variables. This can include 
bidirectional relationships between pairs of 
components (i.e., each component in the pair directly 
impacts the other component) as well as certain 
mediating relationships in which a variable has an 
impact on a chain of other variables which, in turn, 
ultimately has an impact on the original variable 
itself. The presence of such non-unidirectional 
relationships also effectively serves to demonstrate 
not only that the whole is more than the sum of the 
parts, but also that the parts cannot be understood by 
studying the whole alone and that the parts are 
dynamically interrelated or interdependent. 
 
4.2. GST: Requirement to recognize “goal 
seeking,” which is that “systemic interaction 
must result in some goal or final state to be 
reached or some equilibrium point being 
approached” 
 
To demonstrate that a systems theory satisfies this 
requirement involves identifying what constitutes the 
system’s goal, final state, or equilibrium. In biology, 
for a cell, this could be a homeostatic equilibrium. In 
economics, for a business firm, this could be the 
point where marginal cost is equal to average cost. 
For many systems, the goal could simply be survival. 
Another way to demonstrate that a systems theory 
satisfies this requirement involves, first, identifying 
the system’s components and the relationships among 
them and, second, showing how they have been 
structured or programmed so that their interactions 
overall strive to reach or achieve a goal, final state, or 
equilibrium. 
 
4.3. GST: Requirement to recognize the 
“transformation process” by which a system 
“must transform inputs into outputs” in 
order to attain its goal, and the accompanying 
“complexity” and “hierarchy” to which the 
demands of such processing can lead in the 
system’s architecture 
 
Information systems scholars who have taught 
coding in one or another third-generation 
programming language (ranging from COBOL to C#) 
are familiar with the “input-process-output” 
triumvirate, where data are inputted to the “computer 
program,” where the programming steps serve to 
process the data, and where the results from the 
processing are then outputted from the program. This 
is not the general case, but an instantiation, of the 
transformation process found in any system, where 
what is inputted, processed or transformed, and 
outputted is not restricted to data. In this analogy, the 
components and relationships within the 
program/system can grow in complexity as the 
requirements imposed on what the processing is 
required to achieve also increases. As the complexity 
increases, it is addressed by the system’s 
development/evolution/alteration into a set of 
subprograms/subsystems that, therefore, forms a 
hierarchy of systems and also that, through 
interactions among themselves, satisfy the 
requirements imposed on the system as a whole. 
To demonstrate that a systems theory satisfies this 
requirement involves identifying what is being 
inputted to the system, what the system is 
transforming, what the system is outputting, and how 
the system is processing the input into the output. 
 
4.4. LST: Requirement to recognize the 
“system/environment” distinction and its 
ramifications 
 
To satisfy this requirement involves showing how 
the environment is constitutive of the system, how 
the environment and system are structurally coupled, 
how one cannot exist without the other, and how the 
distinction between the system and the environment 
is replicated within the system by “re-entry.” 
 
4.5. LST: Requirement to recognize 
“autopoiesis”  
 
To satisfy this requirement involves showing how 
the system reproduces itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.6. LST: Requirement to recognize 
“communication”  
 
To satisfy this requirement involves showing 
examples of communication in the form of 
announcement/utterance (Mitteilung), information 
(Information), and understanding (Verstehen) where 
the examples can involve both verbal and nonverbal 
communication. The understanding held by the entity 
making the announcement/utterance (Mitteilung) 
need not match the understanding (Verstehen) 
developed by the other person. 
  
4.7. LST: Requirement to recognize “self 
reference”  
 
To satisfy this requirement involves the 
identification of processes (or indeed any other 
mechanisms) through which an organization collects 
information about itself (and its own functioning), 
where this in turn can contribute to a change in its 
functioning. In a sense, “self-reference” is the fuel 
that drives the autopoietic reproduction of systems.  
 
5. A set of requirements for a systems 
theory to satisfy: An illustration with 
Demetis’ case study on Anti-money 
laundering information systems  
 
     The case presented by Demetis [7, p. 341], in 
which the role of information systems in monitoring 
money laundering is examined through the case of 
“Drosia Bank,” can help us illustrate the points 
presented in the previous section. This brief analysis 
is no substitute for Demetis’ own in-depth case study 
of IS complexity, but it provides a way for us to 
apply, for purposes of illustration, what systems 
science is. It is initially important, however, that we 
lay down the context and some critical terminology.  
Financial institutions are compelled by both 
national and international legislation [21] to monitor 
customers for potential money laundering (ML) 
behavior. The banks usually identify such suspicious 
behavior not only by manual means (e.g. when a 
customer conducts a physical transaction in a bank 
branch), but also by using various information 
systems (e.g., a Case Management System or CMS, a 
Messaging/Communication system, and of course, a 
Transaction Monitoring System). When a ML-alert is 
raised about a customer, an analyst investigates the 
alert further and decides whether it is indeed 
suspicious (based on additional information about the 
customer). The escalation of this investigation leads 
to a decision by the bank’s Money Laundering 
Reporting Officer (MLRO) to submit a Suspicious 
Activity Report (SAR) to the national Financial 
Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the country. The FIU 
makes the final decision on whether to forward the 
SAR to the prosecution authorities (and the FIU can 
also request additional information from other local 
banks, insurance companies, tax-authorities, etc., in 
support of the investigation).  
 
5.1. Requirement to account for the principle 
that the “whole is more than the sum of its 
parts”  
 
The interaction between three different 
information systems in the Drosia Bank case, if 
viewed as independent subsystems of the 
technological AML-related infrastructure, would not 
allow detection of the conditions that they exhibit 
when viewed together. For instance, when suspicious 
cases are registered in the Case Management System 
of the AML team, they are assigned a unique code if 
they originate from a specific branch, so as to allow 
for the identification of the branch and the extraction 
of statistics at the regional level. This also allows one 
to observe how well the branch identifies possible 
ML. However, a limitation of the CMS is that it does 
not account for mergers of branches (where the 
designer of the software claimed that it could not be 
fixed without a complete redesign); the consequence 
was that, after a merger, non-existent branches 
continued to exist virtually [7, pp. 72-73]. This had 
an impact on other systems (e.g. the system for 
transaction monitoring) that then needed to 
accommodate “virtual transactions,” with the result 
that their operations also became affected. Moreover, 
the compiling of statistics became compromised.  
This illustrates the idea that different information 
systems “feed off each other.” The “collective” 
information system is what emerges from these 
interactions and is inextricably bound (or structurally 
coupled) with the social context in which it is 
embedded.  
 
5.2. Requirement to recognize “goal seeking”  
 
 In the context of Drosia Bank, if we consider the 
system to be the AML group of the bank, then its 
goal would be the identification of suspicious 
behavior relating to ML. In order for the system to 
accomplish this goal (and avoid financial fines and 
reputational risk), the AML group strove to balance 
the subsystemic goals that converged into its higher-
level (or systems-level) goal-seeking identity. A 
sample of such subsystemic goals involves, among 
 
 
 
others: (1) optimizing the capacity of manual ML-
analysts to examine individual cases and (2) 
improving the SQL queries that filter transaction data 
in order to flag suspicious transactions. In the case of 
Drosia Bank, 2000 alerts were generated by the 
software every day, while the ML-analysts only had 
the capacity to investigate 100 of these alerts 
manually. As a result, the bank hired more personnel 
and the real number of suspicious cases (after 
thorough analysis) actually turned out to be 10 cases 
per month (from 60,000 alerts generated by the 
software). This brought the True Positive Rate (TPR) 
of the system to 0.017%. Gradual improvement of 
this percentage  (which increased to about 1-2%) 
eventually reached an equilibrium where the bank felt 
that it needed either to hire more staff (to increase its 
capacity to investigate more alerts) or to continue 
experimentation with algorithms to detect suspicious 
behavior (which the bank had already tried and did 
not work). Of course, changes in the environment 
(e.g. legislative requirements and FIU demands) 
might prompt the bank to pursue further changes, 
leading to yet another (dynamic) equilibrium point.  
 
5.3. Requirement to recognize the 
“transformation process” by which a system 
“must transform inputs into outputs” in 
order to attain its goal  
 
 In the case of any bank that seeks to optimize the 
identification of ML suspects, the transformation 
process can be described as: inputs come in the form 
of raw financial transaction data (generated by 
customers or other parties as they transact with the 
bank); the process occupying the logical space 
between inputs and outputs is the fundamental 
identity of the transformation process – in the case of 
Drosia Bank, it consisted of algorithmic models (e.g., 
SQL queries) that encapsulated the abstractions of 
suspicious behavior and were applied to input in the 
form of raw transaction data, which included sanction 
list data (e.g. issued by the EU or the US 
government) with names of suspects that needed to 
be checked [7, pp. 94-95]; and finally, the application 
of such algorithmic models to the raw transaction 
data resulted in the outputs – the potential suspects 
for money laundering that then needed to be checked 
thoroughly by ML-analysts so that the suspicions 
could be substantiated.  
 
5.4. & 5.5. Requirements to recognize the 
system/environment distinction and 
autopoiesis 
 
Where we consider the system to be the bank’s 
AML group, the system/environment distinction 
manifests itself in two ways. First, the external 
environment is everything besides the bank (every 
other institution in the financial sector, the FIU, the 
Central Bank, etc.).  What comes into focus for the 
system itself is mostly guided by its own goal-
seeking strategies and the structural couplings it has 
established. Second, there is an internal environment 
(other departments within the bank – excluding the 
AML group). So the same distinction 
(system/environment) that is applicable externally is 
also applicable internally. In this way, the system of 
the bank creates both internal/external 
differentiations (based on the system/environment 
distinction) and collects information about its own 
functioning. This “re-entry,” as Luhmann calls it, 
gives the system the capacity to distinguish 
environments within itself and maintain its 
autopoietic functioning through internal structural 
couplings.  
 
5.6. Requirement to recognize communication  
 
It is unavoidable that any analysis of the concept 
of communication will entail paradoxes since all 
knowledge is founded on paradox [2]; also, in the 
case of communication, a deconstruction may feel 
strongly coerced as it is usually portrayed at a highly 
abstract level. Still, the analysis of communication in 
the form of announcement/utterance (Mitteilung), 
information (Information), and understanding 
(Verstehen) is helpful in reflecting on the 
transformational ontology of whatever is being 
communicated within a system (or between 
system/environment). In the example of Drosia bank, 
where there is no restriction on the level of 
announcement of the “entity” that is being 
announced, a single financial transaction can itself be 
an announcement/utterance, containing a variety of 
further “information elements.” Such elements were 
dependent on the database structure that the bank 
used for inviting interactions/transactions from its 
environment – i.e. the individual customers; these 
elements included: the value of transaction, the 
method of transaction (e.g. ATM, bank branch, e-
banking), the location, the transacting code (e.g. 
cash, card, etc.), and about thirty more such elements 
for every single transaction. From the utterance, then, 
of a single financial transaction, which encapsulated 
all of the above elements, Information emerges as the 
subsystemic selection of utterance-elements that are 
relevant for a specific purpose. For instance, the 
AML department in the bank (as a subsystem of the 
Drosia bank system) isolated certain elements that 
 
 
 
were more relevant for profiling money laundering 
transactions (e.g. value, location) while it ignored 
other elements. In this process, the AML department 
could include more Information from different 
“utterance” occurrences (e.g. a tax statement). 
Understanding then implies the cognitive assessment 
of Information (e.g. by ML-analysts) and the latter’s 
connection against the subsystems’ goal-seeking 
identity. Understanding, then, for the AML 
department, implies an assessment of whether the 
selected utterance-elements (that its own subsystem 
perceives as Information) could be considered as 
truly a suspicion that ML is taking place. Only then 
would the MLRO engage with the communication-
system of “submitting SARs” in order to escalate the 
suspicion to the FIU. In such an event, the FIU 
considered the MLRO’s filed SARs as another 
announcement/utterance – the starting point of 
further communication. We use the expression, 
“starting point” to indicate a change in the 
stakeholders participating in communication. A 
closer approximation for the concept of 
communication would not describe communication as 
a sequence of distinct entities but as a dynamic and 
adaptable stream through which different 
interconnecting elements of a system negotiated (in a 
self-referential manner) their own interconnections 
and enabled/disabled information couplings with 
other elements in their environment.  
 
5.7. Requirement to recognize “self 
reference” 
 
     Every system is self-referential and self-reference 
is the mechanism through which the autopoiesis of a 
system can be maintained. Even though there are 
various definitions of self-reference, it is important to 
re-state that LST is closer to the 2nd-order cybernetics 
tradition: this implies that the system “collects 
information about its own functioning, that in turn – 
can contribute towards a change of its functioning.” 
In this context, all the subsystems of a system 
contribute to its autopoietic reproduction and fuel its 
self-reference. In the context of the AML department, 
there were various ways in which it collected 
information about (and for) itself (both by 
“exploiting” the other subsystems within the system 
of the bank and treating them as environments – e.g. 
getting marketing data in order to use these in the 
process of profiling ML activities, and also by 
collecting information about itself from the external 
environment). For example, the AML department 
would carefully reflect on any requests from 
prosecution authorities (in order to glean financial 
intelligence and improve its own profiling 
techniques); it would adjust its SARs reporting 
processes and change its own functioning after the 
FIU would reflect on the quality of submitted reports; 
and it would further attempt to enhance its capacity 
for analysis and change its profiling algorithms in the 
face of not only industry feedback, but also online 
forums where companies that have bought the same 
ML transaction monitoring software would reflect on 
its use/improvements/features. Through all of these 
activities, the AML department would enable the 
self-referential character of its operations and support 
the self-reference of the organization.   
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
As mentioned earlier, systems science is not so much 
an empirical science about phenomena in nature or 
society as it is an approach that empirical sciences 
(including IS research) can incorporate.  Different 
aspects of the rich details and reasoning offered by 
the preceding Drosia Bank illustration can be 
incorporated in a positivist theory, an interpretive 
theory, and a design theory. A positivist theory would 
need to allow the modeling of bidirectional and 
recursive relationships between variables. An 
interpretive theory would need to attend to the 
differences made by the subjective meanings or 
verstehen already existing among the individuals in 
the organization or other field setting.  A design 
theory would be required, by the web of relationships 
among subsystems that are the sine qua non of 
systems science, to account for the impacts of IT 
artifacts on social artifacts and other artifacts, for the 
impacts of these other artifacts on the IT artifacts, 
and all the subsequent second-order, third-order, etc., 
impacts of these artifacts on each other.  The 
forgoing is at the level of GST.  If LST is 
additionally followed, then the positivist, interpretive, 
or design theory could additionally apply Luhmann-
defined concepts of system/environment distinction, 
autopoiesis, communication, and self-reference.  A 
researcher, of course, could choose to follow instead 
the concepts of another specific systems thinker, such 
as Checkland [6] or Alter [1]. 
 
We view the requirements of systems science as not 
constraining, but liberating the academic discipline of 
information systems, where systems concepts offer 
new or additional ways by which IS research can 
expand its ways of theorizing.  Not only would the 
discipline then truly deserve its name of information 
systems, but it could also offer better theories with 
which to interpret, explain, and even design 
information systems. 
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